Simranjeet Advocate In Chandigarh - An Overview
family lawyer Chandigarh - http://lawyerchandigarh.com/opinion-of-chandigarh-family-lawyers-on-order-for-maintenance-of-wives-and-children-section-125-of-crpc/. The supplemen- tary Instruments signed by the four States only bring within the scope of discussion those supplementary Instruments on the footing that they were a part of the Instrument of Accession n* * * (5) In this Act a State which has acceded to the Domin- ion is referred to as an Acceding State and the Instrument by virtue of which a State has so acceded, construed togeth- er with any supplementary Instrument executed under this section, is referred to as the Instrument of Accession of that State .
" A supplementary Instrument executed under subsection (3) by the Ruler and accepted by the Governor General is, by virtue of sub-section (5), therefore to be considered a part of the Instrument of Accession of that State. In our opinion, this argument re- quires only to be stated to be rejected. It is not and cannot be disputed that Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar took active part in the deliberations and in the proceedings after 20th February, 1950, and naturally discussed and influenced the decision of the other two members of the Tribunal by such discussions.
The argument of surplusage therefore must fail This is not a case where an outsider was con- sulted by the members of a Tribunal and thereafter the members came to their own independent decision. It is obvious that for making the award all the three persons worked together and were jointly responsible for the result- ant award. nIt was suggested that-his signature on the award could be treated as surplus. Sonia Gandhi, 2001 (8) SCC 233 at page 244 upheld the decision of a Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court wherein it was decided that the jurisdiction of the High Court to try an election petition is not by way of constituting a special jurisdiction and conferring it upon the High Court.
This Court in Hari Shanker Jain v. It is an extension of the original jurisdiction of the High Court to hear and decide the election disputes. Therefore, unless it was shown that the form III-B issued by the revisionist were false or wrong, or the declarations made therein was false or wrong, no proceedings under Section 3-B of the Act could have been initiated. Learned counsel would submit that the respondent has disposed of urea by local sale and has also transferred the stock to various States which have been pursuant to and in compliance of Movement Orders issued by the Government of India from time to time.
Therefore, the assessee cannot be deemed to have issued a wrong certificate. He has referred to directions issued by the Ministry of Chemicals 1997 UPTC 616 of this Court. It is also not the case of the department that the assessee did not use the goods purchased by him for the purpose for which exemption certificate was granted to him. The full bench of the High Court, while adjudicating upon the above controversy had concluded, that temporary employees were not entitled to the minimum of the regular pay-scale, merely for the reason, that the activities carried on by daily-wagers and regular employees were similar.
" On reading this document along with the solenama and the mok- rari lease granted by Jiban Kumari, it appears that she dedicated the property after having created a mokrari lease, that what she purported how to get divorce dedicate was the income derived by way of rent from the mourasi mokrari tenancy, and that she had dedicated this income for specific divorce lawyer Chandigarh purposes with the object of making up the deficit in the income received from other debutter properties. There was also a further clause in that deed to the follow- ing effect :-- "In accordance with the terms of the solenama the ex- penses of the Iswar seba shall be met from the income of those properties which have been dedicated for the perform- ance of the work of the said seba and the amount by which the expenses for the festivals would fall short and the expenses which would be incurred for repairs to house for sheba of the said Thakur shall be met and the Tahailia (attendant) and the Brahman cook and the Brahman priest (now) employed and to be employed hereafter shall get (their) salaries, from the income of the said property.
This presumption is considerably strengthened here as well as in the case of the lease granted by Muni Bibi, by the fact that the grantor of the lease was so devoted to the object of the endowment that it does not seem likely that she would have granted a permanent lease unless she was impelled to do so by absolute necessity. will 343 apply to this house, and the presumption as to necessity which is raised by the long lapse of time, would arise here also.
If, on the other hand, it is held on reading the solenama that Jiban Kumari had only a life estate in the house and it was one of the terms of the solenama that after her death the expenses of the deity were to be borne out of the income from the house, then in that case the question may arise as to whether she was entitled to create a lease beyond her lifetime. It seems to us therefore that the view taken by the High Court is substan- tially correct and the respondents Nos.
95 must fail, and it is dismissed. Such a question however does not need an elaborate answer, because the same considerations which apply to 140, Cotton Street. If it is held that Jiban Kumari was an absolute owner of the property at the time the moura- si mokrari lease was granted and afterwards she dedicated only the income of the property then the permanent lease cannot be assailed. In this view, Appeal No. 1 and 2 are entitled to compensation as permanent lessees.
